State v. Stell Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 43967 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-1-2017
State v. Stell Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43967
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Stell Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 43967" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6364.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6364
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, ) NO. 43967
)









REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. NYE
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
State of Idaho Criminal Law Division
I.S.B. #6555 P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
JENNY C. SWINFORD (208) 334-4534
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263









TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................1
Nature of the Case .....................................................................................1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .....................................................................2
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................3
I. The District Court Erred When It Admitted An Audio Recording Of
Mr. Stell’s Arrest ....................................................................................3
II. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stell’s Rule 29 Motion
For Judgment Of Acquittal For Carrying A Concealed Weapon
While Intoxicated ...................................................................................7
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................8




Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).............................................................................................5
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) ................................................................................ 3, 6
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) ....................................................................... 4, 5
State Cases
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445 (2012) ......................................................................................6
State v. Bagshaw, 141 Idaho 257 (Ct. App. 2004) ........................................................................3
State v. Brennan, 117 Idaho 123 (Ct. App. 1990) ........................................................................3
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011) .......................................................................................5
State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132 (2014) .........................................................................................5
State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558 (2013) .........................................................................................4
State Rules
Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 404 .................................................................................3
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found Mr. Stell guilty of aggravated assault (with the deadly weapon
sentencing enhancement), malicious injury to property, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated. He raised two
issues on appeal: whether the district court erred by admitting an audio recording of
Mr. Stell’s arrest; and whether the district court erred by denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal for carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated. (App. Br.,
pp.7–23.) This Reply Brief responds to some, but not all, of the State’s arguments. For
the issues not addressed herein, Mr. Stell respectfully refers this Court to his Appellant’s
Brief.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were articulated in Mr. Stell’s




I. Did the district court err when it admitted an audio recording of Mr. Stell’s arrest?
II. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Stell’s Rule 29 motion for judgment of




The District Court Erred When It Admitted An Audio Recording Of Mr. Stell’s Arrest
On appeal, Mr. Stell challenged the admission of the police’s audio recording of
his arrest, State’s Exhibit 20, on two separate bases. (App. Br., pp.8–16.) He first
contested the exhibit’s admissibility under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 404.
(App. Br., pp.9–12.) For this issue, Mr. Stell respectfully refers this Court to his
argument in his Appellant’s Brief. Second, Mr. Stell argued the prosecutorial misconduct
in presenting evidence of Mr. Stell’s invocation of his right to counsel in the audio
recording violated his fundamental rights to due process and a fair trial. (App. Br.,
pp.12–16.) A few of the State’s arguments on this issue warrant a reply.
First, the State maintains a defendant’s post-Miranda invocation of his right to
silence differs from his post-Miranda invocation of his right to counsel. (Resp. Br.,
pp.10–11.) Not so. Once given Miranda warnings, a defendant’s invocation of his right
to counsel necessarily encompasses an invocation of his right to remain silent. In State
v. Bagshaw, 141 Idaho 257 (Ct. App. 2004), the Court of Appeals explained:
If a defendant in custody invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right to
counsel upon being read Miranda rights, police must cease the
interrogation until an attorney is present. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 482 (1981). Police may not re-initiate an interrogation with a
defendant who has requested counsel. Id. at 484–85.
Id. at 260; see also State v. Brennan, 117 Idaho 123, 124 (Ct. App. 1990) (“Whenever
an accused has invoked his right to counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation
until counsel has been made available to him, unless he initiates further communication
with the police.”). The United States Supreme Court also recognized the interplay
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between a Fifth Amendment invocation of the right to remain silent and a Fifth
Amendment invocation of the right to counsel: “With respect to post-Miranda warnings
‘silence,’ we point out that silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the
statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an
attorney has been consulted.” Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 n.13 (1986).
This Court recognized these related protections as well. In State v. Parton, the
prosecutor elicited testimony from a police officer that, after the officer asked an
incriminating question, the defendant said “he wanted his attorney,” so the officer
“stopped asking him questions at that time.” 154 Idaho 558, 567 (2013). The
defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was post-Miranda warnings. Id. This Court
held, “The obvious purpose of the deputy prosecutor’s question was to have the officer
testify as to Defendant’s third statement—asking for an attorney when confronted with
the allegation that he had beaten his girlfriend. As such it violated his Fifth Amendment
Rights.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the United States Supreme Court’s and this
Court’s precedent makes clear that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment invocation of the
right to counsel includes an invocation of the right to remain silent. Put another way, a
defendant does not have to separately invoke his right to remain silent after invoking his
right to counsel in order to exercise both Fifth Amendment protections.
Second, the State asserts no authority stands for the proposition that the
prosecutor’s admission of evidence of a defendant’s invocation of the right to counsel
“without more” constitutes a due process violation. (Resp. Br., pp.12–13 (emphasis
omitted).) As discussed above, a Fifth Amendment invocation of the right to counsel
incorporates an invocation of the right to remain silent and, therefore, the prosecutor’s
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comment on that invocation is improper. See State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146–48
(2014); State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60–61 (2011). As the United States Supreme
Court stated in Greenfield, “What is impermissible is the evidentiary use of an
individual’s exercise of his constitutional rights after the State’s assurance that the
invocation of those rights will not be penalized.” 474 U.S. at 295. It is “fundamentally
unfair” for the prosecutor to “breach” the “implied promise” in the Miranda warnings and
use invocation as evidence of guilt. Id. Similar to a comment on the invocation of the
right to silence, a comment on the invocation of the right to counsel breaches the
implied Miranda promise.
Third, the State contends any comment on Mr. Stell’s invocation was not used to
impeach him or imply guilt. (Resp. Br., p.13.) Mr. Stell agrees that the prosecutor’s
presentation of evidence on his invocation was not used for impeachment purposes. But
that is not the issue here. Mr. Stell did not allege the prosecutor used evidence of his
post-arrest, post-Miranda silence to impeach him, which is prohibited under Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618–19 (1976). The error here occurred during the prosecutor’s
case-in-chief. Just like a comment on invocation for impeachment purposes, the
prosecutor is also prohibited from using evidence of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence
“as substantive evidence of guilt in the State’s case-in-chief.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60
(citing Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 292). That is what happened here. The prosecutor used
evidence of Mr. Stell’s invocation as evidence of guilt in its case-in-chief. The evidence
was not relevant for any other purpose.1
1 The State also asserts the prosecutor’s comment on Mr. Stell’s invocation of his right
to counsel during his custodial interrogation does not impeach him in any way because
Mr. Stell was represented by counsel at trial. If this were correct, then any prosecutor’s
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Finally, Mr. Stell has met his burden to show his failure to object on constitutional
grounds was not strategic or tactical. The State asserts Mr. Stell’s counsel made a
tactical decision not to object because, after his invocation of his right to counsel,
Mr. Stell made statements (prompted by police questioning2) that “nothing happened.”
(Resp. Br., p.13.) Thus, the State reasons that trial counsel wanted the jury to hear
Mr. Stell’s protestations of innocence. This is curious because the State also agrees
with Mr. Stell’s position that the prosecutor admitted the exhibit to show Mr. Stell was
lying to the police. (Resp. Br., p.4.) The State cannot have it both ways. State’s
Exhibit 20 cannot show Mr. Stell was lying when examining its admissibility under the
Idaho Rules of Evidence, but then also show Mr. Stell was telling the truth when
examining its admissibility under the Fifth Amendment. There is no strategic or tactical
reason for trial counsel to want the jury to hear more of Mr. Stell’s lies and offensive
comments to the police, plus an invocation of his right to counsel after Miranda
warnings.
For these reasons, and those stated in Mr. Stell’s Appellant’s Brief, he
respectfully requests that this Court hold Mr. Stell has shown fundamental error in the
prosecutor’s presentation of evidence of Mr. Stell’s invocation of his right to counsel.
comment on a defendant’s invocation of his right to silence during a custodial
interrogation would never be improper if the defendant exercised his right to remain
silent at trial.
2 After a defendant invokes his right to counsel, the police must stop the interrogation
“until counsel has been made available to him, or until he himself ‘initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.’” State v. Adamcik, 152
Idaho 445, 469 (2012) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485). Here, after Mr. Stell
repeatedly told the police officer he wanted his attorney “right now” and that he
understood his rights, the police officer then asked him, “Okay. So, you don’t want to tell
me then what happened, huh?” (State’s Ex. 20, 2:40–3:34.) This further questioning by
the police officer was improper under Miranda.
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II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stell’s Rule 29 Motion For Judgment Of
Acquittal For Carrying A Concealed Weapon While Intoxicated
In response to Mr. Stell’s sufficiency argument, the State contends the evidence
was adequate to show Mr. Stell was intoxicated because he engaged in unlawful and
irrational behavior. (Resp. Br., p.17.) The State contends Mr. Stell’s conduct in and of
itself (pointing a gun at Ms. Garcia’s car, crawling out of the bathroom window, and
trying to provoke the police) could not be attributable to anything but intoxication. In the
State’s view, intoxication is the only reasonable explanation why someone would
engage in such behavior. In short, a sober person simply would not commit crimes or
act “like an ass.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.133, Ls.2–7.) This is absurd. There are many non-
alcohol related reasons why someone would commit a crime or otherwise engage in
foolish or dangerous behavior. If that were not true, then a presumption of intoxication
would apply almost every criminal defendant.
There is no basis in this case to connect the dots of Mr. Stell’s behavior to
intoxication based solely on the fact that he had “a little bit probably” of the malt liquor.
The evidence was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Stell was intoxicated while carrying a concealed weapon. Mr. Stell
therefore submits the district court should have granted his motion for judgment of
acquittal on this offense.
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CONCLUSION
For the charge of carrying a concealed weapon while intoxicated, Mr. Stell
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this
case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal for the offense.
Due to the evidentiary error in admitting State’s Exhibit 20, Mr. Stell respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgments of conviction and remand
these cases for a new trial.
DATED this 1st day of May, 2017.
/s/JENNY C. SWINFORD
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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